Reframing Internal Federalism As A Security Imperative Rather Than A Political Concession

By Yahya

Pakistan’s enduring struggle with extremism and internal insecurity is often framed narrowly through militancy, ideology, or regional geopolitics. Beneath the visible manifestations of violence, however, lies a more structural and persistent problem: the failure of internal federalism. The excessive centralization of power within Pakistan’s provinces, particularly Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has created deep governance deficits, regional alienation, and systemic marginalization of peripheral populations. These fault lines have, over time, provided fertile ground for extremist narratives and non-state actors to entrench themselves within disaffected communities. At its core, federalism is not merely a constitutional arrangement; it is a governance philosophy aimed at bringing the state closer to the citizen. In Pakistan, federalism has largely stalled at the inter-provincial level. While the 18th Constitutional Amendment significantly devolved authority from the federation to the provinces, it failed to address the equally critical question of intra-provincial devolution. As a result, provinces have effectively replicated the same centralized, extractive governance model they once criticized at the federal level.

Pakistan’s provinces are among the largest subnational units in the world in terms of population and geographic diversity. Punjab alone has a population exceeding 120 million, yet it is governed through a highly centralized provincial secretariat in Lahore. Sindh, dominated politically and administratively by Karachi, governs vast rural hinterlands with minimal representation in decision-making. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, expanded after the merger of the former FATA, now spans radically different social, tribal, and geographic zones, while Balochistan’s sparse population masks deep internal divisions and governance challenges. These oversized provincial units are administratively unmanageable under a centralized model. Decision-making authority over development funds, policing priorities, education policy, health infrastructure, and local governance remains concentrated in provincial capitals. Peripheral regions such as South Punjab, interior Sindh, Hazara, Malakand, southern KP, and neglected districts of Balochistan experience the state as distant, unresponsive, and extractive. This imbalance is not merely administrative; it is deeply political. Representation within provincial assemblies is numerically skewed in favor of dominant regions, allowing ruling elites to perpetuate control over resources and policy priorities. Over time, this has produced a sense of internal colonialism, where peripheral regions perceive themselves as governed by external elites with little understanding of, or interest in, their lived realities.

Marginalization in Pakistan is not accidental; it is a structural outcome of centralized provincial governance. Development indicators across peripheral regions consistently lag behind provincial averages. Access to quality education, healthcare, infrastructure, and employment opportunities remains uneven, reinforcing cycles of poverty and exclusion. More damaging is political marginalization. Peripheral regions often lack meaningful participation in policy formulation, budgetary decisions, and administrative appointments. Local grievances—whether related to land disputes, policing excesses, resource allocation, or cultural recognition—remain unresolved or are addressed through ad hoc, coercive measures rather than institutional solutions. This governance vacuum weakens the legitimacy of the state. When citizens do not see the state as a fair arbiter or service provider, they seek alternatives, whether through ethnic movements, sectarian networks, or militant organizations that promise justice, identity, and empowerment.

Extremism does not emerge in isolation; it thrives in spaces where governance is weak and legitimacy is contested. In Pakistan’s peripheral regions, extremist groups have repeatedly exploited narratives of exclusion, injustice, and occupation. They frame the provincial and federal state as an alien force that extracts resources, suppresses local identity, and denies political agency. In South Punjab, militant organizations have capitalized on socio-economic deprivation and sectarian polarization. In interior Sindh, nationalist and criminal networks blur into extremist ecosystems. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s former tribal districts and the Malakand region, decades of administrative neglect and ambiguous legal status created conditions in which militant groups could establish parallel systems of justice and taxation. These dynamics are not coincidental. Centralized governance creates long feedback loops between grievance and redress. By the time discontent reaches provincial capitals, it has often hardened into resentment. Extremist actors, operating closer to the ground, are faster to respond, offering simplified explanations and immediate, if brutal, solutions.

Ironically, Pakistan’s Constitution already provides the legal space to address this problem. Article 239 allows for the creation of new provinces through constitutional amendment, requiring political consensus rather than legal innovation. Yet, despite repeated public demands for new provinces, most notably South Punjab and Hazara, no credible institutional mechanism has been established to evaluate or advance such proposals. The absence of a constitutional or statutory framework for internal provincial reorganization has transformed a governance question into a political taboo. Proposals for new provinces are treated as zero-sum political gambits rather than administrative reforms. Without neutral criteria or an independent process, the debate remains hostage to electoral calculations and elite anxieties. This legislative gap is one of Pakistan’s most consequential governance failures. By refusing to institutionalize a rational process for internal federalism, the state has allowed grievances to fester, harden, and radicalize.

Resistance to the creation of new provinces is not ideological; it is political-economic. Entrenched provincial elites across party lines derive significant benefits from centralized structures. These include electoral dominance through population-heavy constituencies, control over development funds and public-sector appointments, and the preservation of patronage networks that sustain political power. New provinces would dilute these advantages by redistributing representation, decentralizing fiscal authority, and empowering new political actors. For existing elites, this represents an existential threat. Consequently, legitimate demands for administrative reorganization are framed as conspiracies, divisive plots, or threats to national unity. This elite capture of federalism undermines democratic accountability, prioritizes political survival over governance effectiveness, and signals to marginalized populations that peaceful, constitutional reform is unattainable, an implication that extremist groups are quick to exploit.

Reframing internal federalism as a security imperative rather than a political concession is essential. Effective counter-extremism requires more than kinetic operations; it demands governance structures that prevent grievances from emerging in the first place. Smaller, administratively coherent provinces can improve service delivery, enhance accountability, and strengthen citizen-state relations. Proximity of governance allows for faster dispute resolution, culturally sensitive policymaking, and more responsive policing. It also creates space for local leadership to emerge within constitutional frameworks, reducing the appeal of non-state actors. International experience supports this approach. Countries with diverse populations and complex geographies, such as India, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, have repeatedly reorganized internal boundaries to manage conflict, improve governance, and stabilize fragile regions. While not without challenges, internal reorganization has often proven less destabilizing than persistent marginalization.

To move beyond political paralysis, Pakistan requires a Federal Provinces Reorganization Commission Act. Such legislation would establish an independent, technocratic body mandated to assess proposals for new provinces based on objective criteria rather than political expediency. Key metrics should include population size, administrative efficiency, service delivery outcomes, security indicators, economic viability, and cultural coherence. The commission’s role would not be to impose outcomes but to provide evidence-based recommendations, enabling informed parliamentary debate and democratic decision-making. Crucially, this process would depoliticize the question of new provinces. By shifting the debate from slogans to data, it would reduce elite manipulation and restore public trust in constitutional mechanisms. It would also signal that the state recognizes governance reform as a legitimate response to internal challenges.

Pakistan stands at a crossroads. Continued reliance on centralized provincial governance will deepen polarization, strain security institutions, and perpetuate cycles of extremism. Alternatively, embracing internal federalism offers a path toward inclusion, stability, and democratic renewal. The choice is not between unity and division but between adaptive governance and structural decay. Provinces are not sacred political estates; they are administrative instruments meant to serve citizens. When they fail to do so, reform is not only justified—it is necessary. Addressing extremism requires confronting uncomfortable truths about power, privilege, and governance. Internal federalism, grounded in constitutionalism and evidence-based policymaking, offers Pakistan a chance to heal its internal fault lines before they are further exploited by forces that thrive on fragmentation. If Pakistan is serious about defeating extremism in the long term, it must begin not on the battlefield but in the architecture of governance itself.

A Public Service Message